民诉法对检察机关的民事法律监督职责作了重大调整，其中第209条对当事人向检察机关申请抗诉或检察建议作了如下规定:“有下列情形之一的，当事人可以向人民检察院申请检察建议或者抗诉:(一)人民法院驳回再审申请的;(二)人民法院逾期未对再审申请作出裁定的;(三)再审判决、裁定有明显错误的。”“人民检察院对当事人的申请应当在三个月内进行审查，作出提出或者不予提出检察建议或者抗诉的决定。当事人不得再次向人民检察院申请检察建议或者抗诉。”该条第二款首次规定向检察机关申诉的次数仅限一次，即在检察机关作出提出或者不予提出检察建议或者抗诉的决定后“当事人不得再次向人民检察院申请检察建议或者抗诉”。如此制度设计，是从当前的司法实际出发，有利于维护司法权威，节约司法资源，并从制度上终结诉讼程序，杜绝无休止的申诉上访。但是，在司法实践中对当事人申请检察监督的以下几种情况应有所区别:
一、当事人在诉讼中曾就审判人员的违法行为向检察机关申请过监督的，不影响其依照民诉法第209条的规定再次向检察机关提出监督申请。民诉法第208条第3款规定:“各级人民检察院对审判监督程序以外的其他审判程序中审判人员的违法行为，有权向同级人民法院提出检察建议。”实践中，有的当事人在诉讼中的一审或者二审进行中，认为审判人员在审理案件时有某种违法情形，依据第208条第3款的规定，到检察机关申请要求予以监督纠正，检察机关经审查作出支持或不支持其监督申请的决定后，该案经终审裁判及再审程序，同一当事人又因不服终审裁判，再次到检察机关来申诉的，检察机关应当受理。因为，前一个监督申请依据的是民诉法第208条第3款的规定，而后一个监督申请依据的是民诉法第209条第1款，且适用第209条第2款的前提是该条第1款所列明的三种情况，即法院驳回再审申请的;法院逾期未对再审申请作出裁定的;再审判决、裁定有明显错误的。因前后两个监督申请的内容不同，所依据的法律规定不同，所以不影响当事人的再次监督申请。
二、当事人因不服终审裁判申请过检察监督后，不影响其在执行程序提出监督申请。当事人因对终审裁判不服，向检察机关提出监督申请，并经检察机关作出相关决定后，案件进入了执行程序。当事人认为执行人员在执行中有违法情形的，可以向检察机关提出监督申请。当事人在提出执行监督申请后，认为原裁判有错误向检察机关提出监督申请的，亦应允许。民诉法第235条规定:“人民检察院有权对民事执行活动实行法律监督。”对判决、裁定的监督与对执行活动的监督是对不同诉讼程序的检察监督，二者并行不悖，不管当事人先对哪个程序提出监督，都不影响其对另一个程序提出监督申请。
三、当事人在提出监督申请后，在检察机关作出决定前撤回申请的，不影响其在法定期限内再次向检察机关提出监督申请。在办理民事申诉案件时，经常有当事人因证据不充分，或正在与对方当事人协商和解等情况，而主动向检察机关撤回申诉的情况。申诉权属于当事人意思自治的范畴，是否行使应由当事人自行决定。当事人撤回申请后检察机关所作出的终止审查决定是程序上的一种决定，并不是针对申诉内容作出的决定。因此，只要在法定的申诉期限内，当事人再次向检察机关提出监督申请的，与民诉法第209条第2款的立法本意并不冲突，所以，对于当事人撤回申诉后又行使申诉权的应当允许，检察机关亦应当受理。
四、当事人因不服终审裁判申请过检察监督后，又以出现民诉法第200条第(一)、(三)、(十二)、(十三)规定的情形，再次到检察机关申请检察监督的，检察机关应当受理。检察机关对民事裁判进行监督的主要依据是民诉法第200条规定的十三种情形，符合这十三种情形的可以向法院提出检察建议或者抗诉。同时，该条亦是法院因当事人申请启动再审的法定条件。
民诉法第205条在对当事人向法院提出再审申请作出六个月时限规定的同时，又将第200条第(一)、(三)、(十二)、(十三)四种情况作了例外处理，即当出现“有新的证据，足以推翻原判决、裁定的”等四种情况时，当事人申请再审的期限为“自知道或者应当知道之日起六个月内提出”。
法律之所以将上述四种情况的申请再审时限作了特殊规定，是因为该四种情况的出现时机是不确定的，如果不加以区分，一律以裁判发生法律效力后六个月为申请再审的时限，有可能损害当事人的权益。为了维护司法公正，充分保护当事人的合法权益，民诉法才作了例外的规定。目前，虽然对检察机关在特定情形下能否再次受理当事人的监督申请存在不同认识，但笔者认为，民事诉讼中的检察监督是保证民事司法公正，维护法制统一，救济当事人权益的最后一道程序，按照民诉法第205条规定的立法精神，对当事人因不服终审裁判已经向检察机关提出过监督申请而未得到支持后，又以出现第200条第(一)、(三)、(十二)、(十三)四种情况为由再次申请监督的，检察机关应当受理审查。
总之，对民诉法第209条第2款，既要把握精神实质，严格遵照执行，又要结合相关法律规定，务实灵活运用，以达到强化法律监督与保护当事人申诉权的统一，力争使每一个当事人都能从检察机关办理的民事申诉案件中感受到公平正义。(景县人民检察院 王永刚)
Chapter IV
Function of Panels: Art. 11 of the DSU


OUTLINE


I Introduction
II Application of Art. 11 as a General Standard of Review
III Review in “neither de novo nor total defence”
IV Allegation against Panels’ Standard of Review
V Exercise of Judicial Economy





I Introduction
The function of panels is expressly defined in Art. 11 of the DSU, which reads as follows:

“The function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under this Understanding and the covered agreements. Accordingly, a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. Panels should consult regularly with the parties to the dispute and give them adequate opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory solution.”

This provision suggests that the function of panels is to make an objective assessment such as to assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. However, how do panels fulfill their functions as provided in Art. 11 of the DSU? It is the issue that we will touch on in this chapter. In this chapter, the author explores on the standard of review issue under the WTO, i.e. “an objective assessment”; as well as on the exercised judicial economy principle developed in panel’s review.
With regard to the standard of review issue, the GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures have increasingly confronted questions concerning the degree to which an international body, under the GATT/WTO, should “second guess” a decision of a national government agency concerning economic regulations that are allegedly inconsistent with an international rule. It seems clear that the international agreement doesn’t permit a national government’s determination always to prevail, otherwise the international rules could be easily evaded or rendered ineffective. But should the international body approach the issues involved without any deference to the national government? It has been argued in the GATT/WTO proceedings that panels should respect national government determinations, up to some point. That “point” is the crucial issue that has sometimes been labelled the “standard of review”.1
Of course, this issue is not unique to the GATT/WTO. Naturally, the standard-of-review issue is one that many legal systems face. “The standard-of-review question is faced at least implicitly whenever sovereign members of a treaty yield interpretive and dispute settlement powers to international panels and tribunals. Moreover, as national economies become increasingly interdependent, and as the need for international cooperation and coordination accordingly becomes greater, the standard-of-review question will become increasingly important.” 2 And “it can be seen that the standard-of-review question is a recurring and delicate one, and one that to some extent goes to the core of an international procedure that must (in a rule-based system) assess a national government’s actions against treaty or other international norms”. 3
However, for the immediate purpose, we want to focus below on the more particular question of the proper standard of review for a WTO panel when it undertakes to examine a national government’s actions or rulings that engage the question of consistency with the various WTO agreements and are subject to the DSU procedures.

II Application of Art. 11 as a General Standard of Review
Under the WTO jurisprudence, it’s demonstrated that Art. 11 of the DSU has been applied as a general standard of review. Art. 11 suggests that the function of panels is to make “an objective assessment” so as to assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements.
For example, in US-Shirts and Blouses (DS33), the Panel rules that, “although the DSU does not contain any specific reference to standards of review, we consider that Article 11 of the DSU which describes the parameters of the function of panels, is relevant here”. 4
And the application of Art. 11 as a general standard of review under the DSU is analyzed systematically in EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48) where the Appellate Body rules that: 5
“The first point that must be made in this connection, is that the SPS Agreement itself is silent on the matter of an appropriate standard of review for panels deciding upon SPS measures of a Member. Nor are there provisions in the DSU or any of the covered agreements (other than the Anti-Dumping Agreement) prescribing a particular standard of review. Only Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement has language on the standard of review to be employed by panels engaged in the ‘assessment of the facts of the matter’. We find no indication in the SPS Agreement of an intent on the part of the Members to adopt or incorporate into that Agreement the standard set out in Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Textually, Article 17.6(i) is specific to the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
[…]
We do not mean, however, to suggest that there is at present no standard of review applicable to the determination and assessment of the facts in proceedings under the SPS Agreement or under other covered agreements. In our view, Article 11 of the DSU bears directly on this matter and, in effect, articulates with great succinctness but with sufficient clarity the appropriate standard of review for panels in respect of both the ascertainment of facts and the legal characterization of such facts under the relevant agreements […]”
In sum, for all but one of the covered agreements, Art. 11 of the DSU sets forth the appropriate standard of review for panels. As stated on more than one occasion, Art. 11 of the DSU, and, in particular, its requirement that “a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”, sets forth the appropriate standard of review for panels examining the consistency or inconsistency of alleged measures under the WTO jurisprudence. And the only exception is the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, in which a specific provision, Art. 17.6, sets out a special standard of review for disputes arising under that Agreement（to be discussed in subsequent chapter）.6

III Review in “neither de novo nor total defence”
In EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48), in the view of the European Communities, “the principal alternative approaches to the problem of formulating the ‘proper standard of review’ so far as panels are concerned are two-fold. The first is designated as ‘de novo review’. This standard of review would allow a panel complete freedom to come to a different view than the competent authority of the Member whose act or determination is being reviewed. A panel would have to ‘verify whether the determination by the national authority was…correct (both factually and procedurally)’. The second is described as ‘deference’. Under a ‘deference’ standard, a panel, in the submission of the European Communities, should not seek to redo the investigation conducted by the national authority but instead examine whether the ‘procedure’ required by the relevant WTO rules had been followed”.7 In this respect, the Appellate Body rules that:8
“So far as fact-finding by panels is concerned, their activities are always constrained by the mandate of Article 11 of the DSU: the applicable standard is neither de novo review as such, nor ‘total deference’, but rather the ‘objective assessment of the facts’. Many panels have in the past refused to undertake de novo review, wisely, since under current practice and systems, they are in any case poorly suited to engage in such a review. On the other hand, ‘total deference to the findings of the national authorities’, it has been well said, ‘could not ensure an 'objective assessment' as foreseen by Article 11 of the DSU’.”
The ruling is confirmed on many other occasions. For example, the Panel on US-Underwear (DS24) finds that: 9
“In our opinion, a policy of total deference to the findings of the national authorities could not ensure an ‘objective assessment’ as foreseen by Article 11 of the DSU. This conclusion is supported, in our view, by previous panel reports that have dealt with this issue, and most notably in the panel report on the ‘Transformers’ case.
The panel in the ‘Transformers’ case was confronted with the argument of New Zealand that the determination of ‘material injury’ by the competent New Zealand investigating authority could not be scrutinized by the panel. The ‘Transformers’ panel responded to this argument as follows:
‘The Panel agreed that the responsibility to make a determination of material injury caused by dumped imports rested in the first place with the authorities of the importing contracting party concerned. However, the Panel could not share the view that such a determination could not be scrutinized if it were challenged by another contracting party. On the contrary, the Panel believed that if a contracting party affected by the determination could make a case that the importation could not in itself have the effect of causing material injury to the industry in question, that contracting party was entitled, under the relevant GATT provisions and in particular Article XXIII, that its representations be given sympathetic consideration and that eventually, if no satisfactory adjustment was effected, it might refer the matter to the CONTRACTING PARTIES, as had been done by Finland in the present case. To conclude otherwise would give governments complete freedom and unrestricted discretion in deciding anti-dumping cases without any possibility to review the action taken in the GATT. This would lead to an unacceptable situation under the aspect of law and order in international trade relations as governed by the GATT’.”
In short, for the panel to adopt a policy of total deference to the findings of the national authorities could not ensure an “objective assessment” as foreseen by Art. 11 of the DSU. This conclusion is supported, in our view, by previous panel reports that have dealt with this issue. However, panels do not see their review as a substitute for the proceedings conducted by national investigating authorities, either. For example, in Argentina-Footwear (DS121), the Panel doesn’t consider that they have the mandate to conduct a de novo review: 10
“This approach is consistent with the reports of panels reviewing national investigations… The panel on United States - Anti-dumping Duties on Import of Salmon from Norway concluded that it should not engage in a de novo review of the evidence examined by the national investigating authority.
The panel on United States - Underwear followed this approach by noting, however, that it did not see its ‘review as a substitute for the proceedings conducted by national investigating authorities or by the Textiles Monitoring Body (TMB). Rather…the Panel's function should be to assess objectively the review conducted by the national investigating authority, in this case the CITA. We draw particular attention to the fact that a series of panel reports in the anti-dumping and subsidies/countervailing duties context have made it clear that it is not the role of panels to engage in a de novo review. In our view, the same is true for panels operating in the context of the ATC, since they would be called upon, as in the cases dealing with anti-dumping and/or subsidies/countervailing duties, to review the consistency of a determination by a national investigating authority imposing a restriction under the relevant provisions of the relevant WTO legal instruments, in this case the ATC. …’
Accordingly, the panel on United States - Underwear decided, ‘in accordance with Article 11 of the DSU, to make an objective assessment of the Statement issued by the US authorities … which, as the parties to the dispute agreed, constitutes the scope of the matter properly before the Panel without, however, engaging in a de novo review. … an objective assessment would entail an examination of whether the CITA had examined all relevant facts before it, whether adequate explanation had been provided of how the facts as a whole supported the determination made, and, consequently, whether the determination made was consistent with the international obligations of the United States’.
The panel on United States - Shirts and Blouses also stated that ‘[t]his is not to say that the Panel interprets the ATC as imposing on the importing Member any specific method either for collecting data or for considering and weighing all the relevant economic factors upon which the importing Member will decide whether there is need for a safeguard restraint. The relative importance of particular factors including those listed in Article 6.3 of the ATC is for each Member to assess in the light of the circumstances of each case’.
These past GATT and WTO panel reports make it clear that panels examining national investigations in the context of the application of anti-dumping and countervailing duties, as well as safeguards under the ATC, have refrained from engaging in a de novo review of the evidence examined by the national authority.”
However, as emphasized by the Appellate Body, although panels are not entitled to conduct a de novo review of the evidence, nor to substitute their own conclusions for those of the competent authorities, this does not mean that panels must simply accept the conclusions of the competent authorities. In this respect, the phrase “de novo review” should not be used loosely. If a panel concludes that the competent authorities, in a particular case, have not provided a reasoned or adequate explanation for their determination, that panel has not, thereby, engaged in a de novo review. Nor has that panel substituted its own conclusions for those of the competent authorities. Rather, the panel has, consistent with its obligations under the DSU, simply reached a conclusion that the determination made by the competent authorities is inconsistent with the specific requirements of the covered Agreement. 11